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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. BERNARD GILLIAM, 
Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Evidence-Intent.-Implied findings of jury that 
defendant had requisite intent to justify a verdict of first 
degree murder are sustained by evidence that there was no 
provocation for his conduct in striking and kicking decedent, 
that the assault took place some time after his drinking 
and lasted for more than an hour, that only after the victim 
stopped breathing did defendant desist in his efforts, that 
on his arrest he offered no resistance but admitted his guilt 
freely, that when an officer asked him if he realized what 
had happened he replied, "What are you going to do, fry 
me," and that he made statements to several officers that 
if decedent was not dead he would finish him off. 
[2] !d.-Instructions-Killing in Perpetration of Mayhem.-An 
instruction in a murder case that a person was guilty of 
mayhem even though he had no intention of doing the par-
ticular physical injury constituting mayhem which resulted 
from the attack is not error, and is not prejudicial if error 
be assumed, as against the objection that this lack of intent 
cannot apply to attempted mayhem, where the evidence 
supports the jury's implied finding that defendant intended 
the prolonged assault, including a kick which gouged an 
eye, and as a result the victim is dead. 
[3] Criminal Law-Continuances-Time to Prepare Plea.-Denial 
of defendant's request for a third continuance was not im-
proper on the ground that he was thereby refused a reason-
able delay to obtain material considered necessary in the 
preparation of a proper plea in a murder case where, at the 
time of the request, he was permitted to enter the plea of not 
guilty with a reservation of the right to change his plea 
and request a continuance of the trial if deemed neces-
sary, where that course was followed and he changed his 
plea to not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, 
where no further request for a continuance was made, and 
where there is no showing that the additional evidentiary 
matter was other than cumulative or that it would have had 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Homicide, § 106; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 464. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 158; [2] Homicide, § 188; 
[3] Criminal Law,§ 252(2); [4] Indictment and Information,§ 100. 
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a material effect on the verdict or on the outcome of a 
motion for new trial. 
[4] Indictment and Information-Defects and Objections-Waiver. 
-Where no motion was made to set aside an information 
pursuant to Pen. Code, § 995, any invalidity in the proceed-
ings prior to commitment on the preliminary hearing, in-
cluding the objection that defendant was not informed of 
his rights nor represented by counsel, is waived. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County 
and from an order denying a new trial. Philip Conley, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment imposing death penalty 
affirmed. 
Floyd H. Hyde and Alfred Thomas for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Wallace G. Colthurst, Dep-
uty Attorney General, for Respondent. 
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment impos-
ing the death penalty and from the order denying a motion 
for a new trial. 
On August 30, 1951, the defendant, known as "Red," wa:s 
in the county jail in Firebaugh because of intoxication. On 
Septt;mber 1st he was released to work as a flagman at road 
construction. He worked during the morning. At noon and 
during the afternoon he drank some wine and beer. Later 
he consumed a small amount of food at a cafe and drank 
more beer. He testified that a Mexican in the cafe beckoned 
him to the rest room where he gave the defendant a mari-
juana cigarette. After taking one or two puffs he claimed 
to have "blacked out" and did not remember anything of 
the events that followed. 
Some time between 8 and 8 :30 that night the chief of 
police saw the defendant and said he should be taken into 
custody. The defendant, 35 years of age and weighing about 
212 pounds, was known to cause trouble after consuming 
intoxicating liquor. He was placed in a jail cell with three 
men, Leyva, Saccum, and Paul Self, the decedent. When 
the officers locked the door the defendant went to the aper-
[ 4] See Cal.Jur., Indictment and Information, § 67; Am.Jur., 
Indictments and Informations, § 187. 
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ture and cursed them. He then turned his attention to the 
men in the cell. He took Leyva's hand saying "You are 
my friend, huh?'' Leyva complained that the defendant 
was too stout and that his handshake hurt. Defendant shook 
hands with Saccum who objected for the same reason. He 
"messed" with Leyva and again with Saccum who remarked 
that he was ruptured. He pushed them around for a while, 
twisting one's head, the other's arm, throwing one into a bunk 
and out again, until Saccum said that he was sick and asked 
to be let alone. The defendant then noticed Self, who was 
lying in the lowest bunk, and ordered him to get out. There 
was no response and the defendant pulled him out with the 
blankets. Self offered no physical resistance, but calling him 
''Red'' said he had done nothing and not to hit him. The 
defendant struck him several times so that his head fell 
against the wall about 18 inches above the floor. The de-
fendant invited him to get up, calling him a name. Saccum 
told him the man was unconscious and couldn't get up. 
The defendant suggested that Saccum shut his mouth or 
he'd get some of it. He again bothered Saccum and Leyva 
alternately until asked to desist. The defendant then re-
turned to Self and continued kicking him, Saccum repeatedly 
asking him to stop but being told to "shut up." At some 
point the defendant picked up Self and dropped him on the 
floor, the head striking first. At another he kicked Self in 
the face with his heel, tore the flesh, and displaced an eye. 
He picked him up, held his feet apart and kicked him in 
the groin. Finally when gurgling sounds indicated the last 
of Self, the defendant sat down and ordered Saccum to pull 
off his shoes which were wet with blood. Saccum complied. 
These activities occupied considerably more than an hour. 
At about 10 :15 p. m. they heard a car and Saccum stated 
that he thought the ''cops'' were coming. The defendant 
rolled into a bunk telling them to say nothing or they'd 
get the same treatment. The officers came in and remarked 
''it looks like we have a dead man here.'' They handcuffed 
''Red'' who exclaimed that if the man wasn't dead he would 
finish him off. He was then taken to Fresno county jail 
where he refused to make a statement, saying that he sup-
posed they would ''fry'' him but corrected himself to indi-
cate that in California it would be "gas." An autopsy on 
the decedent revealed that death ensued from shock and 
hemorrhage caused by multiple fractures to the skull and 
torso. 
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On his arraignment the defendant was informed as to 
his legal rights and requested counsel. Attorneys Floyd H. 
Hyde and Alfred Thomas were appointed. The defendant 
pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. 
'rrial was had on each issue and consumed eight trial days. 
On the issue of not guilty the jury found the defendant 
guilty of murder in the first degree without recommenda-
tion; and on the issue of not guilty by reason of insanity 
he was found to have been sane at the time the offense was 
committed. 
The defendant moved for a new trial on the statutory 
grounds or for reduction of the degree of the crime on the 
ground that the evidence was insufficient to indicate that 
he had the requisite intent to justify a verdict of first de-
gree murder. The motion was denied. 
No contention is made that the verdict of sanity is unsup-
ported by the evidence. 
On the issue of guilt the record does not support the 
contention that the defendant suffered a blackout in the 
nature of a psychomotor or psychic seizure. Facts con-
cerning his background and the results of laboratory tests 
were put in evidence. The defendant was born in Arkansas. 
His mother died when he was 2 years of age and he was 
raised by grandparents on a farm. He attended school to 
the sixth grade at age 13, having repeated some grades. His 
father remarried several times. Accidents indicate two head 
injuries, one of which occurred while he was in the army. 
He claims to have suffered a four-day blackout in 1946. He 
married. He has a history of addiction to alcohol which in-
creased after marital difficulties developed. He joined the 
Army to get away from them, was sent overseas but was dis-
charged for habitual drunkenness. An electroencephalograph 
examination and reading, a laboratory test used in the prac-
tice of neurology, indicates at most a borderline abnormal, 
but does not show a major disorder. 
The defendant contends that there is no evidence of 
premeditation or of facts sufficient to show a purpose to tor-
ture or to perpetrate mayhem (Pen. Code, § 189), which 
would justify the verdict of first degree murder. He relies 
on People v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d 72 [207 P.2d 51], to indi-
cate that the elements of torture were not present. He con-
tends that the evidence shows that he was in a psychic seizure 
or in a fighting mood brought on by an intoxicated condi-
tion; that his primary purpose was not to cause suffering, 
July 1952] PEOPLE v. GILLIAM 
[39 C.2d 235; 246 P.2d 31] 
239 
to put out an eye, or to kill, but only to play or fight with 
the other men in the cell. He also contends that death did 
not occur in the perpetration of mayhem because there is 
no evidence that the victim was alive when he kicked him 
in the face. 
[1] There is sufficient evidence to support the jury's im-
plied finding that the defendant was not suffering from a 
temporary amnesia or from any condition or disorder which 
prevented him from having the requisite malice and intent. 
There was no provocation for his conduct and the circum-
stances attending the killing showed an abandoned and malig-
nant heart together with a consciousness of guilt which sup-
ports the verdict. (People v. Isby, 30 Cal.2d 879, 890 [186 
P.2d 405] .) This is further emphasized by testimony that 
only when the victim stopped breathing did the defendant 
desist in his efforts and that on his arrest he offered no re-
sistance but admitted his guilt freely. The record supports 
the jury's implied finding that he was capable of delibera-
tion, intent, and malice. An officer asked him if he realized 
what had happened. He replied, "What are you going to 
do, fry me. . . . Well, you don't scare me in any way . . . 
that isn't the first time I've killed anybody . . . I am not 
afraid to die.'' The defendant made statements to several 
of the officers that if the decedent was not dead he would 
finish him off. Asked why, he replied that he couldn't stand 
him any longer, but on being pressed would give no reason, 
saying ''never mind.'' After he corrected himself as to 
the method of execution in California, the defendant was 
asked whether there was any possibility of mistake as to who 
did the killing. Referring to the blood on his clothes, he 
asked them to figure it out for themselves. 
On the record the jury could justifiably conclude that 
the defendant had the requisite intent which would support 
the verdict on any or all of the theories submitted to it. 
Considering the deliberateness of his acts and statements, 
the time intervening since his drinking, and the length of 
time consumed in committing the assault, the jury could 
infer that the defendant knew what he was doing and that 
he committed the acts with homicidal intent. The jury could 
also conclude that responding to an unprovoked sadistic ten-
dency he had the purpose and intent to cause cruel suffer-
ing on the part of the decedent, and that among the tor-
turous acts of brutality he maliciously gouged the victim's 
eye with his heel. The evidence that the defendant did not 
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desist until his victim stopped breathing supports the con-
clusion that he was alive when that kick was administered. 
The justification for the implied findings of the jury, which 
support the verdict of first degree on any or all of these 
theories, differentiates the result from that in People v. Tubby, 
supra (34 Cal.2d 72), and does not call for the application 
of that case nor of other cases on which the defendant relies. 
[2] There is no merit in the contentions of misdirection 
in the instructions on torture and mayhem. Requested in-
structions given as modified embodied the elements of in-
tent, purpose and malice. The court on its own motion gave 
an instruction including the definitions of mayhem and at-
tempted mayhem. That instruction stated that a person was 
guilty of mayhem even though he had no intention of doing 
the particular physical injury constituting mayhem which 
resulted from the attack. The defendant contends that this 
lack of intent cannot apply to attempted mayhem. (See 
People v. Nolan, 126 Cal.App. 623, 637-638 [14 P.2d 880] .) 
No contention is made that as to all other issues the jury 
was not fully and fairly instructed. Inasmuch as the record 
clearly supports the jury's implied finding that the defendant 
maliciously intended the prolonged assault, including the 
kick which gouged the eye, and that as a result Self is dead, 
there can be no question of prejudice if error in the respect 
claimed be assumed. 
[3] The defendant was granted two postponements for 
his arraignment. He contends that by the denial of a third 
request for a continuance he was refused a reasonable delay 
in order to obtain material from government agencies con-
sidered necessary in the preparation of a proper plea. At 
the time of the request (October 1st) the defendant was 
"permitted to enter the plea of not guilty with a reservation 
of the right to change his plea to include that of not guilty 
by reason of insanity and make a request for continuance 
of the trial if deemed advisable. That course was followed 
and on October 31 the defendant changed his plea to not 
guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial on 
the plea of not guilty commenced on November 6th and con-
sumed six trial clays. The trial on the plea of not guilty by 
reason of insanity consumed two clays. No further request 
for a continuance was made. There is no merit in the con-
tention that the defendant was not afforded a reasonable time 
in which to determine the nature of his plea. In effect he 
was given the time requested for the investigation reasonably 
July 1952] PEOPLE v. GILLIAM 
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necessary for entry of the additional plea and preparation 
for trial thereon. His contention that the material sought 
arrived too late for use on the trial or on the motion for 
new trial, and that it was not merely cumulative, was argued 
on the hearing on the appeal. There is no showing that the 
additional evidentiary matter was other than cumulative or 
that it would have had a material effect on the verdict or 
on the outcome of the motion for a new trial. Since also 
the opportunity to ask for further continuances was pre-
served no prejudice appears from the refusal to grant the 
additional delay for arraignment. Nor can it be said that 
there is any basis for a new trial or for a reduction of the 
degree of the crime. 
[4] The defendant contends that he was denied due proc-
ess because he was not informed of his rights nor repre-
sented by counsel on his preliminary hearing. That con-
tention is not a subject for consideration now. The de-
fendant did not move to set aside the information pursuant 
to section 995 of the Penal Code. The omissions of which 
he complains affect the legality of his commitment on the 
preliminary hearing. By failing to move to set aside the 
information he has waived the alleged invalidity. (Pen. Code, 
§ 996; In re Tedford, 31 Cal.2d 693 [192 P.2d 3].) Unlike 
the case of In 1·e James, 38 Cal.2d 302 [240 P.2d !396], on 
which reliance is placed, the defendant was ably represented 
by counsel and was cognizant of his rights on his trial in 
the superior court. Nothing appears to indicate that he did 
not have a full and fair trial. 
The judgment and the order denying the motion for new 
trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent, 
On the authority of People v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d 72 [207 
P.2d 51], I would modify the judgment by reducing the 
degree of crime to murder of the second degree and as so 
modified affirm the judgment. 
